Jump to content

kosmonooit

Members
  • Posts

    7013
  • Joined

  • Last visited

Everything posted by kosmonooit

  1. He is consolidating various beliefs put forth recently on the Interwebs, and he omits to say at the beginning "In my opinion as a software engineer, not an aeronautical nor a professional who worked on or with this type" You can't rule anything out at this stage but typically disasters like this are not the result of one error or problem, but a series of issues / problems / decisions / reactions. In terms of software it doesn't have to be a bug as such but behavior under certain conditions. Software is created by humans who try think through the problem or the task and try and think of every eventuality but often this is not the case.
  2. It not just about being productive, its the way establishing an argument works, in proposing a hypothesis you need to reference sources upon which you build your argument. At least that is the way I was taught. As I said not that I am saying that blog is wrong (anon blog it should be said, no reference to authors) but what we need to see is a graph of center of lift vs attitude vs speed vs throttle position. Surely that is not proprietary or design secrets, its flight / performance characteristics which every pilot flying the type should be familiar with. Also from what I understand there is multiple ways of disengaging MCAS, surely the pilots were aware, or should have been aware its tad touchy but who knows its all speculation at this stage, but I am sure the facts will come forth soon. But I am going back to the problem of over-automation and the belief that the computer will fly the plane. Remember that Asiana Airlines Flight 214? "The NTSB found that the "Mismanagement of Approach and Inadequate Monitoring of Airspeed led to the Crash of Asiana flight 214". The NTSB determined that the flight crew mismanaged the initial approach and that the airplane was well above the desired glidepath. In response, the captain selected an inappropriate autopilot mode, which, without the captain's awareness, resulted in the autothrottle no longer controlling airspeed. The aircraft then descended below the desired glidepath with the crew unaware of the decreasing airspeed."
  3. its not trim tabs its the AoA of whole horizontal stabiliser that gets adjusted by that trim system,as the blancolirio explains
  4. That is someone's blog, they need to provide references to reinforce their claims instead of stating it as fact. I am not saying that what they are saying is not true but we need verifiable facts here. In one sentence this blog states: "All objects on an aircraft placed ahead of the Center of Gravity (..) will contribute to destabilize the aircraft in pitch." So that is weight fwd of the COG that will tend to weigh the nose DOWN or even perhaps induce some oscillations, as I suggested earlier unless this is compensated some how with more mass aft of the CoG, I find it hard to believe the designers would not have compensated for that. "But if the pilot for whatever reason manoeuvres the aircraft hard, generating an angle of attack close to the stall angle of around 14°, the previously neutral engine nacelle generates lift. A lift which is felt by the aircraft as a pitch up moment (as its ahead of the CG line), now stronger than on the 737NG." But what has been said here earlier is that the nacelles push the nose up, this blog is saying that the lift from the nacelles only kick in at high AoA - this is what we need a reference to source for.
  5. Interesting - you are saying the lift for the nacelles are the culprit, would be interested to read about that, I'll do some trolling of the interwebs later - it has to be out there.
  6. that screw was the trim on the elevator / horizontal stabiliser The trim tabs are the small little wings at the tail end of the control surfaces - normally say when climbing out one trims so that you don't have to keep holding the stick back, it becomes a second instinct to always trim for your intended path of flight. The MCAS apparently uses the trim tabs for control as well, but that can easily be overridden with switches and apparently these pilots were trained in this system and were made aware of the issues post Lion Air disaster. So the plot thickens.
  7. They are saying that moving the engines forward on the 737 max series can cause the nose to pitch up under power/certain circumstances - but how so? Moving weight forward would move the COG forward, causing a tendency to pitch down surely under static conditions. So what causes the aircraft to pitch up here? I am stinking maybe its the point of thrust from the engine causes a moment of force up relative to the COG that needs to be compensated hence the MCAS?
  8. Media get it often wrong - how many presenters on the likes of CNN and NBC etc kept on about the engines on the Max being moved closer to the fuselage (they were moved forward for clearance) and getting confused between the 787 and the 737 etc Anyway that aircraft must have hit mother earth some some incredible velocity given the way it was smashed up to bits like this. Imaging the horrific task of retrieving bodies and body parts.
  9. Hormones might well have had something to do with this disaster
  10. Oscillations - resonance?
  11. What they are saying now is that with increased resolution from sat data the profile of the vertical speed is close to that of the Lion Air flight, suggesting commonality. Seattle, we have a problem.
  12. If they can identify the behavior, yes. In the Lion Air a faulty Attitude Indicator was blamed for trigger the system that pushes the nose down but from what I am hearing the final report has yet to come out, laying out the exact sequence and causes and concluding that disaster. Maybe there is some hitherto unknown set of circumstances that causes the flight computer to loose the plot and fly the aircraft into the ground at high speed. But ultimately its not actually the computer doing this, it the people who develop this system and who often over estimate their knowledge of the world and life. In this age of increasing automation, this is a risk, and an increasing likely scenario. AI - I wont even go there.
  13. Yes its an evolution and a better safer product emerges .. but what I am saying is that what it was some kind of horrible software bug that they cant duplicate or nail down.... being a software engineering IT type I am only too aware of such gremlins. What we often say is that if you can duplicate a problem, you have solved it.
  14. what if .. there is some type of software bug,... intermittent unrepeatable problems with code and hardware are the worst kind, and real tricky to pin down, often one doesn't and just find away around the problem and hope for the best. This aircraft is fly-by-wire, computers do it all. Looking back at the Comet disasters, it took them a while to figure our the root cause of the disasters, and it was kept flying, and kept exploding. It killed their market (and many a pax) which drove customers towards the Boeing 707
  15. The blancolirio is a very experienced commercial pilot
  16. Very unlikely the First Officer could only have had 200 hours flying time, why I could be a FO then According to others that have picked up this number it seems the 200 hours is with Ethopian
  17. Although the Lion Air accident was the stick pusher that kept pushing the nose down and that only works with no flaps and AP off, and was being activated by a faulty attitude sensor. Pilot was not trained / aware of this new system on the Max and did not know it was doing its thing or how to override it. Faulty sensor was flagged on previous flight yet the aircraft was put back into service. Faulty sensors have caused many disasters, generally the first step in a series of events where often the pilots is misinterpret readings and take incorrect actions. - that Air France Airbus A330 Flight 447 that fell out of the sky in the middle of the night is case in point.
  18. Also I know the trend is been towards electrics for controls, i think the 787 features mainly electric power and motors vs hydraulics for ailerons, flaps and other controls, even the brakes. Not sure if this tech migrated to the 737 Max as yet.
  19. Surely an explosive would like have blown the fuselage apart and there would be a point where it was normal and then it would have gone ... Perhaps a fire in the cargo that started effecting hydraulics / controls ... foobar elevator controls for a start could have resulted in this wildly oscillating climb rate, they probably pulled back the power to try help control it but they needed height as well for a return. But we will soon know, they have the flight and data recorders, they are designed to survive big impacts.
  20. And everyone is an eggspurt on the subject... Although my hunch is that this is not related to the issues experienced by Lion Air, which really was a pilot not familiar with a new system and not being able to handle an error condition. Something big went wrong here, out of the pilots control as I can gather,
  21. Fleets of Max's are being grounded as we speak ....
  22. The impact crater http://avherald.com/img/ethiopian_b38m_et-avj_190310_1.jpg
  23. vertical speed was unstable from the get-go,...? Not to sure why the charts end the way they do considering it must have fallen out the sky to smash up the way it did
  24. from FlightRader24 data
Settings My Forum Content My Followed Content Forum Settings Ad Messages My Ads My Favourites My Saved Alerts My Pay Deals Help Logout